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By resolution of the City Council of Newport, passed on the
4th of March, 1862, their Senator was instructed to endeavor to
procure the alteration or repeal of so much of the charter of
Brown University, as exempts the property of the president and
professors from taxation, the said council stating that in their
opinion there was no justifiable reason for such an exemption,
especially at a time like the present, when all kinds of property
must be necessarily, and probably heavily, taxed for the support
of government and preservation of the Union.
On the 5th of March, 1862, the resolution was referred to the
committee on the Judiciary for consideration.
At February sessions, 1764, the college was incorporated. The
title of the act is, "an act for the establishment of a college or
university within this colony."
The section under which this controversy arises is as follows
"And, furthermore, for the greater encouragement of this seminary of learning, and that the same may be amply endowed and
enfranchised with the same privileges, dignities, and immunities,
enjoyed by the American Colleges and European Universities, we
do grant, ordain, and declare, and it is hereby granted, ordained,
and declared, that the college estate, the estates, persons, and
families of the president and professors for the time being, lying
and within the colony, with the persons of the tutors and students,
during their residence at the college, shall be freed and exempted
from all taxes, serving on juries, and menial services; and that
the persons aforesaid shall be exempted from bearing arms,
1 The following able and comprehensive report, prepared by lMr. Elisha R. Potter,

the chairman of the committee, is well deserving theyperusal of our readers.

subject is one of great and growing importance.-.ds. Am. Law Reg.
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impresses, and military services, except in case of an invasion."
Subsequently the name of Brown University was given to the
institution, in order to commemorate the generous donations of
lion. Nicholas Brown. Two questions present themselves, the
power of the legislature to repeal these exemptions, and the
propriety of doing so. The former of these questions we will
first consider.
We suppose there could be little doubt of the right to repeal it,
unless the legislature is restrained by the provisions of the State
and United States Constitutions from interfering with it, on the
ground that the charter is a contract with the corporation.
Since the year 1663, there has always existed a declaration of
rights in this State, which was modified and enlarged in 1822, but
it contains nothing affecting the present question.
Our present constitution, which took effect in 1843, provides in
its declaration of rights, that ",All laws should be made for the
good of the whole; and the burdens of the State ought to be
fairly distributed among its citizens." In section 12 of the same
declaration it also provides, that no " ex post facto law or laws
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." This seems
to have been adopted from the Constitution of the United States,
which provides, Art. 1, § 2, that no State shall pass any " ex post
facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The provision about ex post facto laws relates only to criminal
or penal legislation.
It seems very strange that the provision about contracts which
has become of so much importance, should have been so little
noticed at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution.
The authors of the Federalist (No. 44) barely allude to it.
Hamilton in No. 32 says: "With the sole exception of duties on
imports and exports, the individual States possess an independent
and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the
supply of their own wants ; and, any attempt on the part of the
National Government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would

LEGISLATIVE RIGHT TO GRANT

be a violent assumption of power unwarranted by any article or
clause of its constitution."
And nowhere in that work, or in the debates at the time, was the
meaning ever given to this clause which was afterwards fastened
upon it. It was undoubtedly intended to remedy the evils which
had grown out of the paper money system, the legal tender laws,
and the various laws interfering with the remedies on private contracts, which had grown out of the distresses of the Revolution.
And so Judge TUCiKER, whose edition of Blackstone was published
in 1803, considers, see vol. 1, Part 1, appendix, - On the Constitution of the United States," page 311. But that a charter was to
be deemed a contract, and to be considered irrepealable, was never
then imagined. As an evidence of this, we may refer to the fact,
that the charters of our two first banks, the Providence Bank and
the Bank of Rhode Island, are published among the public statutes
of the State, in the Digest of 1798.
And the fact that a charter was not then considered a contract
iscertainly important. Contemporaneous construction is always
allowed to have considerable weight in deciding these questi6ns
of construction. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Briscoe vs. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters 318, say-" A uniform
course of action, involving the right of the exercise of an important power by the State government for half a century, and this
almost without question, is no unsatisfactory evidence that the
power is rightly exercised."
And so great was the mischief caused by the construction put on
this clause by the United States Supreme Court, that in nearly all
the charters granted after those decisions were made, an express
provision has been inserted, making them repealable like all other
public acts.
Judge STORY had even gone so far, as to hold that a salary fixed
by law was a contract, 4 Wheaton 694.
There is another consideration, which, if the present case should
ever come before a judicial tribunal, seems entitled to some
weight.
At the time the college charter was granted in 1764, the Legis-
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lature of Rhode Island possessed all legislative power, subject
only to the provision contained in the charter, that the laws should
not be repugnant to the laws of England. With this exception
they possessed the full legislative power over all the business and
property of the colony.
Was the charter considered a contract at the time it was made?
Was it not then taken by the college subject to the repealing
power the legislature then possessed ? and if it was not a contract
then, is it fair to apply to it the provision of the United States
Constitution since made ?
We shall hereafter quote the opinion of Chief Justice REDFIELD
of Vermont, and which will be probably admitted as sound law,
that the American legislatures possess all the powers of the British
Parliament (subject to. the limitations of their constitutions), and
that Parliament possessed full power to legislate upon charters
and to repeal them at pleasure. '
Chief Justice MARSHALL also, in the Dartmouth College case,
4 Wheaton 651, holds the same opinion. "By the Revolution,
the duties as well as the powers of government devolved on
the people of New Hampshire. It is admitted that among the
latter was comprehended the transcendent powers of Parliament,
as well as that of the Executive Department. It is too clear
to require the support of argument, that all contracts and rights,
respecting property, remained unchanged by the Revolution.
The obligations then, which were created by the charter to
Dartmouth College, were the same in the new, that they had
been in the old government. The power of the government
was also the same. A repeal of this charter at any time
prior to the adoption of the present Constitution of the United
States, would have been an extraordinary and unprecedented act
of power, but one which could have been ogntested only by the
restrictions upon the legislature, to be found in the Constitution
of the State.
Blackstone (in Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 90), says:
"Acts of Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent
legislatures, bind not * * * because the legislature being in truth
46
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the sovereign power, is always of absolute authority; it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have
been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament; and
upon the same principle, Cicero in his letters to Attieus treats with
a proper contempt these restraining clauses which endeavor to tie
up the hands of succeeding legislatures. When you repeal the
law itself (says he), you at the same time repeal the prohibiting
clause which guards against repeal." (CGic. ad Att., lib. 3, ep. 23.)
Misquoted in Bank of Ohio vs. KYnoop, 16 Howard 398.
Of course then, before the Revolution and before there was any
constitutional restriction, our legislature had this full power over
charters, and the college took the charter knowing this power
resided in the legislature, and took .it subject to that condition.
Even if the charter was a- contract, this power to repeal was a part
of the contract, it was the condition on which they took the grant
of the franchise. If it was a contract, and this condition of
repealability was a part of the contract, then the United States
Constitution cannot fairly be applied to alter its terms. If it was
not considered a contract then, can the provision in the constitution be applied to it at all? And that it was not considered a
contract at the time seems not to admit of much doubt. And even
when the constitution was made, few of its framers probably ever
imagined that a charter could be considered a contract to come
within the prohibition. Even Judge STORY seems to admit this,
Commentaries, vol. 3, § 1389; and see Judge MARSHALL in -Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheaton 644. It is comparatively a new
construction, and it may be doubted whether even Judge STORY
himself ever supposed the meaning of this clause could be
stretched so as to authorize one legislature to grant a perpetual
exemption from taxes beyond the power of a succeeding legislature
to repeal, for he says in his Commentaries published in 1833, vol.
3, § 1386 : " That the framers of the Constitution did not intend
to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions
adopted for internal government, is admitted, and it has never
been so construed."
We cannot very well come to any conclusion upon this subject
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without taking a historical view of the cases which have been
. decided upon this paragraph of the constitution, which forbids
any State passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
These decisions comprise several classes of cases, and in reading them it may be well to keep in view the distinction between
a grant of land, or a regular treaty made by a State, or a law
which interferes with a private contract on the one band, and
those laws which profess to yield up a portion of the sovereign
power, as the power of taxing, or of taking property for public
use, on the other hand. In regard to the first class of cases there
can be no doubt; if the State has made a grant of land or an
authorized treaty, it ought not to try to recall it. Nor ought
they to interfere in a private contract. But the second class of
cases stands on an entirely different ground; and we may fairly
argue that the people have delegated their sovereign legislative
power to the legislature to be exercised, but not to be surrendered;
and that the legislature exceeds its power when it undertakes to
surrender that trust.
The famous Yazoo case of Fletcher vs. Peck, A. D. 1810, was
the first important case in the history of these decisions. This
was a case where the Legislature of Georgia had granted a tract
of land, and then undertook to repeal the grant. But even here
Chief Justice MARSHALL makes a distinction. "The principle
asserted," says he, "is that one legislature is competent to repeal
any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and,
that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding
legislature." " The correctness of this principle, so far as respects
general legislation, can never be controverted. But if an act be
done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. When
then a law is in its nature a contract, a repeal of the law cannot
divert these rights; and the act of annulling them, if legitimate, is
rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every individual
in the community." 6 Cranch 135. And, in the same case, Judge
JoHnsoN, in delivering his opinion, while agreeing in the decision,
adverts to the distinction we have mentioned, and seems to have
had some foresight of the dangers of the doctrines advanced.
Fletchervs. Peck, 6 Cranch 143.
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Judge JoHNSON.-" I do not hesitate to declare that a State
does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do
it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a
principle which will impose laws even on the Deity.
",A contrary opinion can only be maintained upon the ground
that no existing legislature can abridge the powers of those which
will succeed it. To a certain extent this is certainly correct; but
the distinction lies between power and interest, the right of jurisdiction and the right of soil. The right of jurisdiction is essentially
connected to, or rather identified with, the national sovereignty.
To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide. In fact
a power to produce its own annihilation is an absurdity in terms.
It is a power as utterly incommunicable to a political as to a
natural person. But it is not so with the interests or property of
a nation. Its possessions naturally are in no wise necessary to its
political existence; they are entirely accidental, and may be parted
with in every respect similarly to those of the individuals who
compose the community. When the legislature have once conveyed their interests or property in any subject to the individual,
they have lost all control over it," &c.
The next case which is usually quoted in this connection, is .New
Jersey vs. Wilson, 7 Cranch 104, decided A. D. 1812.
The Legislature of New Jersey in 1758, while subject to no
constitutional limitations, had made a treaty with an Indian tribe
by which they exempted a certain tract of land from taxation.
The Court decided that this was a contract the legislature could
not repeal. There was no appearance for the State, and the case
was not argued at 411. Judge CATRON (16 Howard 401) says,
that the question of one legislature having the power to abridge
the power of the succeeding legislature was not raised there, and
Judge PARKER (10 New Hampshire 138) makes the same remark.
The taxing power had indeed been surrendered, but it had been
done by a treaty made at a time when the State had a right to
make such a treaty, which seems to distinguish this case from
others.
See the case of Armstrong vs. Treasurerof Athens County, 16
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Peters 290, in which Judge CATRON comments on this case of
ew Jersey vs. Wilson.
The next cases in order were Terret vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43,
and Pawlet vs. Clarke, 9 Cranch 292, decided A. D. 1815. These
were cases of grants of land, and the Court decided the legislature
had no power to revoke them.
The next case involving the power of State Legislatures as to
taxation (but not involving the question of contract), was McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 428, decided A. D. 1819.
The State of Maryland had taxed the United States Branch
Bank. It was a conflict of jurisdiction, and the Court decided
that the bank was one of the constitutional means of the general
government for carrying into effect the powers vested in it, and as
such the State had no right to tax it. The sovereign power of
the State did not extend to it. We refer to this case principally
to quote the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, showing that he
considered the power of taxation as essential to the existence of
government, and as one of the incidents of sovereignty.
Judge MARSHALL.-" It is admitted that the power of taxing
the people and their property is essential to the very existence of
government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to
which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. * * * The people of a State, therefore,
give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their
property; and as the exigencies of government cannot be limited,
they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator and on the influence of the
constituents over their representative to guard them against its
abuse. * * * It is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive
with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the
sovereign power of a State extends are objects of taxation," &c.
But the great and leading case on this question, is that of Dartmouth College, also decided A. D. 1819, 4 Wheaton 518. Dartmouth College was incorporated A. D. 1769, and, in 1816, the
Legislature of New Hampshire passed an act altering the charter,
to which act the college corporation did not give their assent.
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The Court here decided that the charter constituted a contract
which the legislature could not alter without the consent of the
corporation.
On reading the report of this case, one cannot avoid observing
the industry and ability with which it was argued by the counsel
for the college, and the half-beartedness or want of interest mani-fested by the counsel for the State. We can only account for it
by supposing that the act of the legislature was really so objectionable in its provisions that the counsel did not feel very anxious to
defend it; and that the Court, from the intrinsic equity of the case
itself, felt a great desire to declare the act void, but in doing so
laid down principles of which they themselves could not foresee
the possible future applications.
But a few years before this, A. D. 1815, the case of Portland
Bank vs. Apthorp. had been decided in Massachusetts (12 Mass.
252), involving the question of the right to tax the banks for their
privileges, and no one thought of referring to this clause of the
constitution as having any connection with it.
Several cases have come before the United States Supreme
Court, involving questions of taxing property which had been by
charter exempted from taxation.
In 1845 the case of Gordon vs. Tax Court, &c., was decided.
3 Howard 144. The corporation had constructed a road, &c., and
in .consideration of that had been exempted from any further tax.
The Court say that the charter was a franchise; that'if the corporation had paid a bonus for it, the legislature could not by a tax
add to the price of it; they construed the exemption to extend not
only to the franchise, but to the stockholders. This, in fact, was
the question contested. There was no attempt to tax the franchise.
Judge CATRoN, of the same Court, afterwards (16 Howard 402)
says, the only question at issue in it was the construction of the
statute, and yet the case is generally quoted as deciding the whole
question.
Afterwards, in the case of the State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop,
16 Howard 369, when the pharter in question had prescribed a
particular rate of tax, the Court held it a contract which the Legis-
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lature of Ohio could not alter. But it is to be observed that three
of the judges dissented from the ,ecision,. and Judge TANEY
agreed to it, but not for the reasons given by the majority. At
the same time the Court decided the case of Life Insurance Company vs. Debolt, 16 Howard 416, involving the right of the Legislature of Ohio to interfere with a rule of taxation prescribed by
a charter. The Court did indeed decide the case against the
State, but the judges disagreed very much in their reasons for the
decision. It might be said that they all dissented.
In the case of the Providence Bank vs. Pitmnan, the same Court,
while intimating that an exemption of charter from taxation might
be held good, decided there was no exemption in that case, and
hold the following language as to the importance of this power of
taxation. Providence Bank, 4 Peters 561.
- That the taxing power is of vital importance, that it is essential to the existence of government, are truths which it cannot be
necessary to reaffirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by
all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is
never to be assumed. We will not say that a State may not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a
partial release of it may not exist; but as the whole community is
interested in retaining it undiminished, that community has a right
to insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed, in a case
in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does
not appear."
It has always been considered by many of the members of the
bar, that the Supreme Court, in their decision, misapprehended the
question in the case. Whose fault it was, it is now of no use to
consider.
These are the principal cases decided in the United States Court,
affecting the right of a legislature to repeal an exemption from taxation granted by charter; and the remarks we have made may
serve to indicate the degree of authority to be attached to them.
The judges have never been unanimous upon it, and some of them
have delivered very able dissenting opinions.
The cases on this question decided in the State Courts, have
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been very differently decided, thus seeming to leave the matter in
a very unsettled state. And many eminent members of the legal
profession, have been of opinion that the Courts have gone too far
in holding (so far as they have held) a charter exemption from
taxation to be irrepealable.
Professor Greenleaf, of the Law School at Harvard University,
gives us his opinion as follows (Greenleaf's Cruise, vol. 8, title
27, § 29, note) :-"-In regard to the position that the grant of the
franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad, is in its nature
exclusive; so that the State cannot interfere with it by.the creation of another similar franchise, tending materially to impair its
value; it is with great deference submitted, that an important distinction should be observed between- those powers of government
which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be
aways preserved in full vigor, such as the power to create revenue
for public purposes, to provide for the common defence, to provide
safe and convenient ways for the public necessity and convenience,
and to take private property for public uses and the like; and
those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power to
alienate the lands and other property of the State, and to make
contracts of service, or of purchase and sale, or the like. Powers
of the former class are essential to the constitution of society, as
without them no political community can well exist, and necessity
requires that they should continue unimpaired. They are intrusted
to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away: and, it
is indispensable, that each legislature should assemble with the
same measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the legislature disabling itself from the future
exercise of powers intrusted to it for the public good must be void,
being in effect a covenant to desert- its paramount duty to the
whole people. It is, therefore, deemed not competent for a legislature to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open
another avenue for the public travel within certain limits or a certain term of time; such covenant being an alienation of sovereign
powers and a violation of public duty." But if a legislature has
availed itself of private capital to make a road, they ought not to
interfere with the privilege without full indemnity.
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Judge REDFIELD (late Chief Justice of Vermont) expresses himself on the subject thus :- In a late case in the Supreme Court
of Vermont (27 Vt. Rep. 140), a doubt is expressed in regard to
the entire soundness of the principle of legislative exemptions of
corporations from taxation. It may be sound, perhaps, within
certain limits, and so far as it can be clearly shown to have formed
an essential ingredient in the consideration which induces the corporators to accept their charter and undertake the offices thereby
created. If it were apparent that, without the exemption, the
company would not have accepted their charter, it might with
great propriety be urged that the indispensable condition of its
existence should be held inviolable, even by the legislature."
And he goes on to observe, that the opinion of Judge CATRON
in Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop, the decision of the State Court of
Ohio in that case, and of the New Hampshire Superior Court in
Brewster vs. Rough, that a legislature has no power to grant a
perpetual exemption from taxation, seems the "sounder view of
the law. And, as we have elsewhere said, we would not be surprised to find hereafter this whole subject of the right of a State
legislature to exempt corporations by their charter from taxation
brought in question, or, at all events, limited to exemption from
special taxation. But the law at present is probably otherwise."
" It seems, too, that upon principle an exemption of this chara.cter is not an essential franchise of the corporation, and is therefore necessarily temporary in its character," &c. Redfield on
Railways 526, note.
In Thorpe vs. Butland, 27 Vermont 140, Chief Justice REDFIELD says, in delivering the opinion of the Court :"It has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the
American Legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to
legislation which resides in the British Parliament, except where
they are restrained by written constitutions. That must be conceded, I think, to be a fundamental principle in the organization
of the American States. The people must of course possess all
legislative power originally. They have committed this in the
most general and unlimited manner to the several State legisla
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tures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States or of the particular State in question.
"It is conceded on all hands that the Parliament of Great
Britain is competent to make any law binding upon' corporations,
however much it may increase their burdens or restrict their
powers, whether general or organic, even to the repeal of their
charters. * * * And if, as we have shown, the several .State legislatures have the same extent of legislative power (with-the limitations
named), the inviolability of these artificial bodies rests on the' same
basis in the American States with that of natural persons."
"It has been questioned how far one legislature could in this
manner abridge the general power of every sovereignty to impose
taxes to defray the expense of public functions. It seems to me
there is some ground to question the right of the legislature to extinguish by one act this essential right of sovereignty. I would
not be surprised to find it brought into general doubt. But at
present it seems to be pretty generally acquiesced in. But all the
decisions in the United States Supreme Court, allowing the legislature to grant irrevocably any essential prerogative of sovereignty,
require it to be upon consideration, and in case of corporations,
contemporaneous with the creation of the franchise. Similar
decisions in regard to the right of the legislature to grant perpetual
exemption from taxation to corporations and property, the title to
which is derived from the State, have been made by this Court (13
Vermont 525; and in some of the other States, 11 Conn. 251, and
cases cited; 24 Miss. 386). But these cases do not affect co
justify even this express exemption from taxation, being held
inviolable, except upon the ground that it formed a part of the
value of the grant, for which the State received a stipulated fee or
consideration."
This case involved the question of the right of the legislature
to pass a law making railroads liable for injuries done to cattle.
The Court sustained the law.
A question may arise what are the essential incidents of a corp1,ration, which belong to it as such, and form a part of the contrac: of incorporation. And here Judge REDFIELD quotes Chief
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Justice MARSHALL, in the Dartmouth 0ollege Case, 4 Wheaton,
and then goes on to say :Certain things it is agreed are essential to the beneficial existence and successful operation of a corporation, such as individuality and perpetuity (when the grant is
unlimited); the power to sue and be sued, to have a common seal
and to contract, and, in the case of a railway, to have a common
stock ; to construct and maintain its road, and to operate the same
for the common benefit of the corporators. Certain other things,
as incidental to the beneficial use of these franchises, are necessarily implied. But there is a wide field of debatable ground outside of all these. It is conceded that the powers expressly, or by
necessary implication, conferred by the charter, and which are
essential to the successful operation of the corporation, are inviolable." And then he further quotes Judge MARSHALL in the
Providence Bank Case, 4 Peters 514. " The great object of an
incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collected and changing body of men. Any privileges
which may exempt it from the burdens common to individuals, do
not flow necessarily from the charter, but must be expressed in it,
or they do not exist."
The case of the right of eminent domain, as it is called, or the
right to take private property for public use, seems to be of a
kindred nature with the right of taxation-(or rather the right of
taxation may be considered as a branch of the right of eminent
domain. In both cases private property is taken for public use.)
After a long struggle the Courts have decided that, although the
charter is a contract, yet the property of the corporation and the
franchise itself may be taken by the legislature for public use, on
paying compensation, and that this right of eminent domain, a
right to take private property for public use, is one of the sovereign powers which one legislature cannot grant away or contract
not to exercise.
" A State," says Chief Justice TANEY, " ought never to be presumed to surrender this power (the right of eminent domain), because, like the taxing power, the whole community have an interest
in preserving it undiminished."
-tkarles River Bridge Case, 11
Peters 544.
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In the West River Bridge Case, A. D. 1848, 6 Howard 507, a
bridge built under a charter had been taken for a highway. The
bridge company relied on their charter being a contract, but the
United States Court held that under the right of eminent domain
the bridge could be so taken. Judge DANIELS delivered the
opinion of the Court :-- No State, it is declared, shall pass a law
idipairing the obligation of contracts ; yet, with this co*ncession constantly yielded, it cannot be justly disputed that in every political
sovereign community there inheres, necessarily, the right and duty
ef guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting
the interests and welfare of the community at large. This power
and this duty are to be executed, not only in the highest acts of
sovereignty and in the external relptions of government; they
reach and comprehend likewise the interior polity and relations of
social life, which should be regulated with reference to the advantages of the whole society. This power, denominated the eminent
domain of the State, is, as its name imports, paramount to all
private rights vested under the government, and these last are, by
necessary implication, held in subordination to this power, and
must yield in every instance to its proper exercise.
"In our country it is believed that the power was never, or at
at any rate rarely, questioned, until the opinion seems to have
obtained that the right of property in a chartered corporation was
more sacred and intangible than the same right could possibly be
in the person of the citizen; an opinion which must be without any
grounds to rest on, &c.
" These decisions (referring to them) sustain clearly the following positions comprised in this summary, given by Chancellor
Walworth (3 Paige 73), when he says that, 'notwithstanding the
grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most
exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have
a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner
directed by the constitution and laws of the State whenever the
public interest requires it. This right of resumption may be
exercised, not only where the safety, but where the interest, or
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even the expedieney of the State is concerned ! In these positions,
containing no exception with regard to property in a franchise (an
exception which we should deem to be without warrant in reason),
we recognise the true doctrines of the law as applicable to the cases
before us.' "
Many other decisions have been made upon this subject of eminent domain, and in favor of the right of the State. In Babcock
vs. Lebanon, 11 New Hampshire 19, the Court sustained the taking
of a turnpike for a highway. The Charles River Bridge Case, 11
Peters Reports 420, is one of the most important. Case of the
Northern Railroad, 7 Foster 183, that one railroad may take the
track of another for compensation. In the case of the Piscataqua
Bridge, 7 New Hampshire 35, the same principle was involved.
The case in 2 Denio 474, relates to blowing up a building to prevent the spread of a fire. See also the case of thre Bnfield Toll
Bridge, 17 Connecticut 40.
In Gozzle vs. Corporation of Georgetown, 6 Wheaton 593, the
streets of Georgetown had been graded, and persons had built on
the faith of it; and the right of the corporation to alter the grades
was disputed, and it was claimed as a contract and unalterable.
The Court, however (Judge MARSHALL giving the opinion), decided
otherwise :-- A corporation can make such contracts only as are
allowed by the acts of incorporation. The power of this body to
make a contract, which should so operate as to bind its legislative
capacities for ever thereafter, and disable it from enacting a bylaw, which the legislature enables it to enact, may well be questioned. We rather think the corporation cannot abridge its own
legislative power."
Does not the reasoning here apply to a State as well as to a city
corporation ?
In 1 Foster (New Hampshire Reports) 393, it is decided that a
town cannot grant an exemption from taxation.
In .Episcopal Church vs. City of New York, 7 Cowen 584, the
city had conveyed land for burial purposes, and covenanted for its
quiet enjoyment. The city afterwards made a by-law prohibiting
interments there, and it was held good. See also 5 Cowen 538.
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In the State courts a number of cases have been decided of
charter exemption from taxation, but not -with sufficient uniformity
to have much weight attached to them. In some of them the
question seems to have been merely a question of construction,
and not involving a right to repeal an exemption once granted.
In Handy vs. Waltham, 7 Pick. 108, Massachusetts had by
statute exempted certain estate of Harvard College from taxes,
and the Constitution of the State had confirmed the privileges of
the college. The court said the exemption could not be repealed.
But this seems to have been a question of construction, and the
present question does not appear to have been raised.
In 1839 the case of Brewster vs. Hougl was decided in New
Hampshire. The Legislature had, in 1780, exempted by statute
certain lands of Dartmouth College. The case was finally decided on the ground that the exemption was merely temporary.
Chief Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court: ,It may
well be doubted, whether the legislature of 1780 could, by any
proceeding which they might adopt, 'make a contract with the
citizens of the State for the permanent exemption of any portion
of the property lying within the government. * * * That
form of government could not from its nature, and the present
constitution does not contain any express grant or authority from
the people empowering the legislature to make such a contract."
5c The power of. taxation is essentially a power of sovereignty,
or eminent domain;. and it may well deserve consideration,
whether this power is not inherent in the people, under a
republican government; and so far inalienable that no legislature
can make a contract by which it can be surrendered, 'without
express authority for that purpose in the constitution, or in some
other way leading directly from the people themselves."
, To hold that the legislature cannot make a grant whereby
the property shall be exempted from public use, and to hold also
that they cannot contract to exonerate the property of the citizens
from taxation, and thereby bind future legislatures, by no means
indicates an opinion that the legislature have a' right to rescind or
abrogate grants of land and franchises,. or contracts lawfully
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entered into by a preceding legislature. The doctrine is well
settled, that legislatures may make grants of some kinds, which
come properly within the denomination of contracts, and such
contracts, when made, are as inviolable as the contracts of an
individual."
"It is as essential that the public faith should be preserved
inviolate as it is that individual grants and contracts should be
maintained and enforced. But there is a material difference
between the right of a legislature to grant lands, or corporate
powers, or money, and a right to grant away the essential
attributes of sovereignty, or rights of eminent domain. These do
not seem to furnish the subject-matter of a contract." Brewster
vs. Hough, 10 New Hampshire 139.
For criticisms on this opinion see American Law Magazine for
1846, Art. 4.
Among the other cases decided in the State Courts on questions
of exemption from taxation by statute or charter, are the following : In Osborne vs. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335, a law of 1802 had
exempted parsonages, &c. from taxation, and the land bad been
leased for 999 years. The act was repealed 1821, and the repeal
was held void. Atwater vs. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223, is a similar
case. In 11 Conn. 251, is a case of ministry land exempted by
statute from .taxation, and the exemption was held good. Judge
CHURcr, however, dissented, and delivered a very able opinion,
reviewing all the cases, and especially commenting on the two
cases in 6 Conn. 223, and 10 Conn. 490, in which cases he says
this question of the power of the legislature was not raised.
1 Metcalf 538, was a question of exempting meeting houses; but
seems to relate to the construction of- the act. 4 Metcalf 564,
seems also a question of construction. " State vs. Branin, 3
Zabriskie 484, also relates to the construction of a statute. So in
State vs. Tunis, 3 Zabriskie. In the case of Aforris Railroad,
3 Zabriskie 529, the charter was repealable. In the case of the
.EastonBank, 10 Barr (Pa.) Reports 442, a rate of tax had been
prescribed in the charter, but no stipulation that there should be
no further tax, and the court upheld the additional tax.
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In 13 Vermont 225, ministry land had been exempted by
statute, and afterwards leased, and the exemption was held good.
In the cases in Ohio--Debolt vs. Ohio Li'fe Insurance Company,
I Ohio 564; Mechanics' Bank vs. Debolt, 1 Ohio .581; Toledo
Bank vs. Boyd, 1 Ohio 622; and Piqua Branoh of State Bank,
vs. Enoop, in same volume, the court deny the right of the
legislature to grant perpetual exemptions, and sustain their opinion by long and able arguments. In Ohio vs. Commercial Bank
of Cincinnati,7 Ohio 125, the rate of tax was fixed in the charter,
and the court seem to hold it a contract the legislature could not
alter, but Judge CATRON (10 Howard 400), says this was merely
a case of construction of a statute, and that the constitutional
question was not raised. See also what Judge CAMPBELL says,
10 Howard 413.
It is to be observed, also, that in very few of these cases was
the State a party, or concerned in the contest; and in some of
them the doctrine of contract is tacitly assumed without argument. As see 17 Conn. 93.
In a recent case, Pennsylvania Canal Commissioners vs. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., decided June, 1857, Chief Justice LEwis
gives a thorough examination of the cases on this question and
concludes that, in the absence of any constitutional authority, a
State legislature has no power to sell, surrender, alienate, or
abridge any of the rights of sovereignty, such as the right of
taxation, so as to bind future legislatures, and any contract to
that effect is void. Although the court refer as authorities to
some of the Ohio cases, which had been reversed in the United
States Supreme Court, yet the decision of the Pennsylvania court
itself, and the reason they give for it, are entitled to no little
weight, and show that the current of legal opinion is beginning to
change upon this subject. See 5 Law Register 623. .edfield on
Railways, § 229, page 531.
There was probably a reason why the courts formerly leaned
strongly in favor of protecting corporations against the power of
the legislatures. There were comparatively few corporations, and
there was a strong popular prejudice against them, and they
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needed the aid of the courts to preserve their existence. At the
present time there is hardly an individual but is interested in some
corporation, and it is rather the legislature which needs protection
against the influence of combined corporations.
If a legislature can irrevocably exempt a* corporation from
taxation, they can do the same with a town. For services to the
State they might exempt an individual, and his descendants, forever. For a sum paid down by way of commutation, they might
exempt an individual, or a city, forever-or, they may exempt a
part of the land in a town forever.
Have the people ever given them such a power?
In many cases the courts have sustained acts of legislatures,
which divested rights of indiiiduals. "It is clear, says Chief
Justice TANEY, "that this court has no right to pronounce an act
of the State Legislature void, as contrary to the Constitution of
the United States, from the mere fact that it divests antecedent
vested rights of property. * * * Nor are we aware of any
decision of this, or any Circuit Court, which has condemned
such a law upon this ground, provided its effect be not to impair
the obligation of a contract." Charles Biver Bridge Case, 11
Peters 540.
We have remarked that Judge STORY went so far as to consider
a salary fixed by law, a contract the legislature could not alter,
the courts have since decided to the contrary. See 8 Howard
163; 10 Howard 395; 6 Howard 548. So it has been decided,
the legislature may release a penalty although the informer may
have an interest in iV: 10 Wheaton 248; 6 Peters 404. It is
difficult to see the distinction between these cases and those where
an exemption from taxation is claimed by virtue, of a repealed
statute. The case of a charter, however, it would be contended
by some, did not stand upon the same ground.
The charter of the college was granted at a time when the
people of the State had, comparatively, little wealth, and when
salaries were small, professors poor, and, even with the exemption
from tax, the professor's salary did not more than comfortably
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support him. Circumstances have changed, and professors are
now among our most wealthy men.
For several years the college had no professor, and for twenty
years they had but one professor. The president's salary was a
mere trifle.
Even if the charter is to be considered a contract, it would be
full compliance with the spirit of the contract to exempt $0,000
worth of property from taxation; that being the amount usually
held by professors in old times.
According to the letter of the charter an officer may hold any
amount of property in trust for others. And the danger of secret
trusts may be great hereafter. If the present officers are above
suspicion, there is no harm in it, and it implies no disrespect to
them, to guard against the future.
Some of the committee were of opinion that it would be
better, as a mark of respect, and as the legislature do not wish
even to appear to do anything to the injury of the college, to
make the act conditional, and to request the consent of the cor.
poration to it. If they refused, it would still be in the power of
the legislature to repeal the exemption unconditionally. But the
majority of the committee think best to report the bill unconditionally, having full confidence in the patriotism of the officers of
the college, and not doubting but that they are willing, especially
in a crisis like the present, to bear their just share of the burdens
of the State..
The committee do not mean to say that the legal question is
free from all difficulty, but they believe the courts will hesitate
long before they deny the power of the legislature to interfere in
the present case.
They respectfully report the following bill:
AN ACT to amend the charter of Brown University by repealing so much thereof
as exempts the estates, persons, and families of the president and professors
thereof from taxation.
Whereas, in times of public danger all persons ought to bear their share of the
public burdens in proportion to their ability, and this General Assembly have full
confidence in the patriotism of the said president and professors, and in their

